Terrorism: The How to Guide "Past present future including gurrila warfare"

[Prometheus]

You're so full of shit, you have absolutely no idea what you're talking about. My grandpa was too busy killing germans so you wouldn't have to worship Hitler for the rest of your lives. There wasn't any time to rape french women. You compare our response to 9/11 to the french response to the german invasion? Damn, thats hilarious! After 9/11, we bombed the living shit out of Afghanistan and Iraq, and had covert operations going in Indonesia, Columbia, Somalia, Phillipines, and Kosovo. What was the French response to the German invasion? Asking Hitler to pull his pants down and bend over. If Hitler's body was discovered, there would still be a french lip imprint on his ass. You might like the way France does things, but I prefer the american response. If Al Queda ever invades France, dont kiss Bin Laden's ass for too long, because there is gonna be a US cruise missile heading straight for his asshole.

OMG....lol.......... thats some funny shit im still cring its soo funny!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!


ok so now to shit on ya........ #1 rape........ it happens....... 5 of my grandpas brothers were there...... and well they tell me that there was more tehn once that they ended up beating on some random allied servicemen..... due to the fact that they were raping them....... it fucking happens..... you'd be surprised how much time that you can find to have sex...... no matter what your doing.... screwing in the stacks at the libary the morning b4 a huge final....lol

You compare our response to 9/11 to the french response to the german invasion? Damn, thats hilarious! After 9/11, we bombed the living shit out of Afghanistan and Iraq, and had covert operations going in Indonesia, Columbia, Somalia, Phillipines, and Kosovo.

yup compared it too.... but not so much how you harpe on it.......lets break down some facts here. France was invaded....... by utterly massive amounts of troops in a short amount of time..... the majoirty of french troops were by passed at the start of the invasion so the germans faced little resistance....... but lets say it with me "INVASION" k... you got it right..... k ..... what was 9/11? was it an "INVASION"?...... fuck no...... it was an attack.... the military was not beaten ground was not captired. infastructure was not harmed......and dont go..... the towers are gone..... i may just fly to ya and bitch slap ya.  As for you bombing the shit outta everythign..... forgetting that Afgan was a pure NATO war? thought you did...... forget that Nato memebrs are increasing their deployments to help out the US..... casue unless you want a fucking draft you cant fight 2 wars as much as you say you can..... bombing wise you can... ground wise you can fight and win just not win in the aftermath. Ohhhhh and as for your covert operations ......... i like how you define covert..... it was on the 11pm news not the 6pm...... lol..... its almost as bad a kept secret as the air base canada runs in Saudi..... for doing iraq resupplies and ship resupplies in the middle east..... intresting that we handle about 30% of all goods in theatre and were not in the war.....

oh and as a side note...... if bin ladden did "INVADE" france......... im sure his small numbers would be squashed by french legions.......

invade really.............

You're so full of shit, you have absolutely no idea what you're talking about. My grandpa was too busy killing germans so you wouldn't have to worship Hitler for the rest of your lives. There wasn't any time to rape french women. You compare our response to 9/11 to the french response to the german invasion? Damn, thats hilarious! After 9/11, we bombed the living shit out of Afghanistan and Iraq, and had covert operations going in Indonesia, Columbia, Somalia, Phillipines, and Kosovo. What was the French response to the German invasion? Asking Hitler to pull his pants down and bend over. If Hitler's body was discovered, there would still be a french lip imprint on his ass. You might like the way France does things, but I prefer the american response. If Al Queda ever invades France, dont kiss Bin Laden's ass for too long, because there is gonna be a US cruise missile heading straight for his asshole.

Oh my god !!!! 

You're really unbelievable ... man you know a lot about France ... have you ever been here ?

If I have to bow down and ask the United States for help and be eternally thankful afterwards ... so do you ... Lafayette ? Ring a bell ?

And stop wanting to nuke eveyone's ass because that's the best way for you to have your own ass nuked !

And I have to remind you we were w/ you in afganisthan ... and in the first Iraq war ... our troops were in ex-yougoslavia ... we're not and never were sitting on our asses ... And our dicks are bigger than yours type of debates are riduculous.
And for ww2 we declared war against germany in 1939 ... where were you back then ? I know it's a stupid statement but I want you to understand that against your stupid statements we can find some of the same level !

ya.... but its the classic US responce uptill that point...... wait till they attack us if not its not our problem....... well they were this way since they tried to invade canada..... and we flattened you guys and burnt down teh white house as a warning......lol....... i gues Canada is on the US hit list still...........


Rain if your dick is bigger....... that would be rather disturbing......... lol

[Jessica]

 Security Sources: all 4 bombers are dead.
All bombers are British born.

[Prometheus]

man .......... they are all coming outta the wood work now..... wever extreme wing group is going to start doing this shit now i guess.....

[Prometheus]

Whither Political Islam?
Mahmood Mamdani
From Foreign Affairs, January/February 2005

http://www.foreignaffairs.org/20050101fareviewessay84113a/mahmood-mamdani/whither-political-islam.html

The debate over why the attacks of September 11, 2001, occurred has been dominated by different versions of "culture talk," the notion that culture is the most reliable clue to people's politics. Their differences notwithstanding, public intellectuals such as Samuel Huntington and Bernard Lewis agree that religion drives both Islamic culture and politics and that the motivation for Islamist violence is religious fundamentalism. Ascribing the violence of one's adversaries to their culture is self-serving: it goes a long way toward absolving oneself of any responsibility.

The singular merit of two new books by Gilles Kepel and Olivier Roy is that they take the debate about the rise of political Islam beyond culture talk. Kepel seeks to understand the intellectual history of political Islam, Roy the social conditions under which Muslims think and act. Of the two, Roy makes the most forceful break from culture talk. He dismisses "the culturalist approach" that treats Islam as "the issue" and that assumes it bears a relation to every preoccupation of the moment, from suicide bombings and jihad to democracy and secularism. Not only does culturalism treat Islam "as a discrete entity" and "a coherent and closed set of beliefs," Roy explains, but it turns Islam into "an explanatory concept for almost everything involving Muslims."

Roy argues that the Koran's most important feature is not what it actually says, but what Muslims say about it. "Not surprisingly," Roy observes, "they disagree, while all stressing that the Koran is unambiguous and clear-cut." Like culturalists, Roy and Kepel examine very carefully the Islamist discourse about both the Koran and the rest of the world. But they understand it as the product of many forces, rather than as the necessary development of its religious origin. In doing so, they provide a more nuanced understanding of doctrinal and political Islam than do the culturalists.

GOING GLOBAL

In a historical account that is both careful and user-friendly, Kepel tracks two radically different strands of Islamic thought: the ultra-strict, quietist Salafist, or Wahhabi, school and the more political thinking of the Muslim Brotherhood. These two schools later merged, producing the more hybrid ideology now identified with Osama bin Laden.

Kepel traces the origins of Salafism to Saudi Arabia and the ideas of the radical theologian Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab. In the opening decade of the nineteenth century, the Wahhabis and the House of Saud formed an alliance, commencing a state-building project that was completed a century later. Wahhab agreed to glorify the Saudi tribal raids on neighboring oases by treating them as jihads, in return for King Muhammad bin Saud's promise to elevate Wahhabism to a state ideology. The project did not survive the Ottoman invasion in 1818, however, and had to be renewed with a series of Wahhabi-anointed jihads in the 1910s and 1920s. By that time, the jihad was no longer a stand-alone affair: Wahhabi blessings for the Ikhwan, the religious militia of King Saud, were doled out along with bombs dropped by the British, who by then were occupying the Arabian Peninsula. After World War II, the Americans replaced the British as the kingdom's main patrons. And under the presidency of Ronald Reagan, who was eager to use the Saudis as foils for the Soviet Union, "Wahhabism was elevated to the status of a liberation theology--one that would free the region of communism."

According to Kepel, a second, more autonomous and activist strand of political Islam originated in Egypt in the 1920s when the Muslim Brotherhood resolved to go beyond observing sharia (Islamic law) to establish a full-fledged Islamic state. Their slogan was "The Quran is our constitution." The Brothers joined Gamal Abdel Nasser in the Free Officers' Revolution that toppled King Farouk in 1952, but the alliance soon dissolved. Repression, at first in Egypt and then in Baathist Iraq and Syria, forced them to decamp to Saudi Arabia in the 1970s, where they joined forces with religious Palestinians who were uncomfortable with the Palestine Liberation Organization's secular nationalism. Gradually, the brotherhood took control of Saudi intellectual life, positioning itself to shape the country's religious and political awakening after the Iranian revolution of 1979. Its power grew with the attack on the Great Mosque in Mecca on November 20 of that year, which brought the Wahhabists under official suspicion. The religious "awakening" of "a plethora of young radicals" followed; like the Iranian revolutionaries who combined traditional Shiite rhetoric with Third World anti-imperialism (portraying Saudi officials as American lackeys, for example), they mixed the activism of the brotherhood with quietist Salafism, creating "an explosive blend that would detonate throughout the region and the whole world."

The effect was to be momentous. As Kepel points out, after Afghanistan in the 1980s, the jihad went global. The move was not just an expansion in scale; it was also a critical shift in strategy and tactics. Consider, for example, the seminal work by the Egyptian Ayman al-Zawahiri, bin Laden's right-hand man: Knights Under the Prophet's Banner, the most politically grounded and comprehensive manifesto on global jihad. Its text is not yet available in English, but Kepel has translated important sections of it. Zawahiri begins with a call to shift the jihad's target from the "nearby enemy" to the "faraway enemy." To succeed, he says, the jihad needs a new leadership that is sufficiently "scientific, confrontational, [and] rational" to rethink relations between "the elite" and "the masses" and to wield inspirational slogans. (He finds that there is no cause more mobilizing than Palestine, which is "a rallying point for all Arabs, whether or not they are believers.") To those who are ambivalent about the use of political terrorism, Zawahiri explains that it is legitimate to strike Western populations, not just their governments and institutions, because they "only know the language of self-interest, backed by brute military force." "In consequence," he adds, "if we want to hold a dialogue with them and cause them to become aware of our rights, we must speak to them in the language they understand." Zawahiri defends suicide attacks as "the most efficient means of inflicting losses on adversaries and the least costly, in human terms, for the mujahedeen."

The global jihad's radically different goals could warrant only radically different methods and spawn radically different organizations. So instead of seeking out recruits through patient face-to-face encounters as the Afghan jihadists did in the 1980s, the leadership of the global jihad reversed the approach: tapping the potential of the Internet and the global media, it arranged for recruits to come find it. Predictably, the strategy has produced an organization that defies conventional understandings. Al Qaeda, a "terrorist NGO," or nongovernmental organization, is not, Kepel explains, "a nation with real estate to be occupied, military hardware to be destroyed, and a regime to be overthrown." As a result, Washington has ended up reifying the group--to little effect. According to Kepel, with its "Internet websites, satellite television links, clandestine financial transfers, international air travel, and a proliferation of activists ranging from the suburbs of Jersey City to the rice paddies of Indonesia," al Qaeda is resolutely modern and innovative. Unlike culturalists who portray bin Laden and his associates as linear descendants of an esoteric Saudi Wahhabism--or as premoderns with access to contemporary technology--Kepel understands them as hybrid products of multiple intellectual traditions. That insight is the great virtue of his book.

<continued>

[Prometheus]

MISSED METAPHORS

Yet even Kepel's work is not entirely free of culture talk. He tends to associate "reason" with "the West" and "metaphysics" with Islamic homelands. Of the September 11 suicide bombers, he says, "These militants, educated in the West, must have [had] the discipline, intelligence and training to carry out complex operations" and "[been] able to shift back and forth between the rational mindset they had cultivated during their studies of engineering, urban planning, medicine, or administration and an alternate mindset that infused suicide attacks with metaphysical meaning and value." In search of this alternate mindset, he scans "Mohammed Atta's testament," where he finds evidence of "fanatical faith" in the promise of "gardens of paradise" and of houris--the virgins with which the martyrs will sleep, Kepel explains--"wearing their finest clothes."

Here Kepel's logic fails. Roy wonders, quite rightly, how the promise of houris in heaven could motivate female suicide bombers. More to the point, Kepel need not have looked so deep into a martyr's heart to find a contemporary example of how interest and ideology can mix: neoconservatives in the West are as apt an illustration. Kepel does have an inkling that the neoconservatives are a twin of al Qaeda--both came out of the Cold War on the winning side--and he devotes an entire chapter to them. But his occasional reliance on culturalist assumptions blind him to important parallels between the two.

The neoconservatives, Kepel rightly notes, were convinced that the Oslo accords were a trap; some even thought that the entire "[Middle East] peace process posed a potentially fatal risk to the Jewish state." Their alternative to negotiation was to redraw the map of the entire region through occupation, assuming, in a simple-minded analogy with Eastern Europe, that if they blew up the government apparatus of rogue states, the newly liberated peoples would embrace their occupation with gratitude. But Kepel misses the implications of his own observation, largely because he presumes a linear development from U.S. conservatives to neoconservatives that prevents him from understanding what distinguishes the two groups. Is it not precisely the potent mix of cold-blooded interest and hot-blooded ideology that distinguishes neoconservatives who link George W. Bush to Reagan from the conservatives who drove foreign policy under George H.W. Bush?

As a result, Kepel misses key parallels between neoconservatives and jihadists. In addition to the mix of interest and ideology, the two groups share global ambitions and a deep faith in the efficacy of politically motivated violence, and both count among their ranks cadres whose biographies are often tainted by early stints in the Trotskyist or the Maoist left. Both jihadists and neoconservatives are products of the Cold War, when ideologically driven violence was embraced by all sides, secular and religious. Kepel's failure to see this commonality ultimately limits his understanding of jihadist politics, heir not only to the traditions of the quietist Salafism and the Muslim Brotherhood, but perhaps even more so to recent secular traditions, such as Third World anti-imperialism and the Reaganite determination to win "by any means necessary."

Kepel's lapse may explain why he frames this book with a claim that he cannot ultimately sustain: "The most important battle in the war for Muslim minds during the next decade will be fought not in Palestine or Iraq but in these communities of believers in the outskirts of London, Paris, and other European cities, where Islam is already a growing part of the West." Although he points to their vast numbers--there are more than ten million Muslims living in contemporary Europe--Kepel cannot explain their significance except as so many conveyor belts between the East and the West. He does not see the Muslims of Europe as active subjects struggling to establish a new citizenship in adverse circumstances--some of which, such as racism and unemployment, were familiar to earlier immigrants; others, such as the stigma of a terrorist culture, are new. As a result, Kepel presents only stale visions of the future, redolent of culturalism: Will these Muslims bring European modernity to their homelands or religiosity to Europe? Will they be able to forge a democratic Islamic ideology by recognizing that in these times "intellectual creativity and innovation come from the West" and by building appropriate relations with "non-Muslim allies"?

Although Kepel carefully renders the history of Islam's internal debates, he treats them as if they were taking place inside a contained "civilization." Casting contemporary Islam as the product of a linear tradition, he is unable to understand Muslims as fully historical and global. On this point, Kepel's historical analysis is overtaken by Roy's sociological argument.

MONSTER OF MODERNITY

In Globalized Islam, Roy tries to explain why jihadist Islam resonates in the communities in which it does. He sees the spread of jihadist Islam today as "a consequence of and [a] reaction to sociological changes," rather than as "evidence of the permanence of unchanging values" (the culturalist view) or as a direct historical consequence of the Saudis' and Reagan's support for the Wahhabi project (Kepel's view). Roy distinguishes contemporary neofundamentalists from traditional fundamentalists, such as Wahhabis who have tried "to delink Islam from ethnic cultures" for centuries and have everywhere "fought against local Islams"--"Sufism in South Asia, marabouts in North Africa, specific music and rituals everywhere," and even Shafism, Hanafism, and other historical schools of sharia.

For Roy, neofundamentalist Islam is "born-again Islam" and strictly a product of the diaspora. Islamic religious debate is no longer monopolized by the learned ulema (teachers); as they have turned to the Internet, the neofundamentalists have also become tulaab (students). As a result, "religion has been secularized, not in the sense that it is under the scrutiny of modern sciences, but to the extent that it is debated outside any specific institutions or corporations." With the traditional ethnic community left behind, "the disappearance of traditional values ... [has laid] the groundwork for re-Islamisation," which has largely become an individual project. "Islamic revivalism goes hand in hand" with a modern trend: the "culture of the self."

The growing individualization of religious practices has prompted believers to create a new community that transcends strict geography. The consequences of these changes have been contradictory. Those who have succeeded in reconciling the self with religion have tended to embrace a "liberal" or "ethical" version of Islam; those who have not have been prone to embrace "neofundamentalist Salafism." Meanwhile, the quest "to build a universal religious identity, de-linked from any specific culture," has come at a price, because such an Islam is "by definition an Islam oblivious to its own history." As a result, "the quest for a pure Islam [has] entail[ed] also an impoverishment of its content," Roy writes, and the ironic consequence of this quest is "secularization, but in the name of fundamentalism."



<continued>

[Prometheus]

This transformation has had particularly radical consequences for the Muslims of Europe, setting them apart from their cousins in the Middle East. According to Roy, political Islam is bifurcated between Islamist parties in Muslim-majority countries in the Middle East and Islamists in the diaspora. Because in the Middle East, Islamist parties have mobilized in response to particular state policies, by the end of the 1990s, most Islamist movements had become "more nationalist than Islamist." As a consequence of their political integration, "violence related to Islam has been decreasing in the Middle East since 1996."

Islamist violence has increased outside the Middle East, however. The question is why, and why specifically in the West? The answer, Roy ventures, is that the violence of al Qaeda is politically, not religiously, inspired. After all, "al Qaeda did not target St. Peter's Basilica in Rome, but the World Trade Center and the Pentagon. It targeted modern imperialism, as the ultra-leftists of the late 1960s and 1970s did with less success." Furthermore, the cliche "that in Islam there is no difference between politics and religion ... works in favor of the political," making it easier to redefine the core content of religion and subordinate it to a political project, as the jihadists have done.

Even the contemporary notion of jihad is a marked departure--perhaps even a rupture--from its traditional forerunner. It too has been reinvented according to neofundamentalist principles: personalized, secularized, and turned into a political tool. Roy points out that, contrary to Western popular belief, traditional jihad is not one of the five pillars of Islam and that it has long been understood as a defensive, collective duty. But modern radicals now hail jihad as "a permanent and individual duty" to fight the West to the death.

This modern understanding of jihad goes hand in hand with a revamped notion of community, or umma: no longer bound by traditional solidarity, the umma is the "reconstructed" product of the "free association of militants committed to the same ideal." The umma now plays the same role as did the proletariat for Trotskyist and leftist groups in the 1960s: it is "an imaginary and therefore silent community that gives legitimacy to the small group pretending to speak in its name."

Roy observes, moreover, that most contemporary Islamist ideologues are neither clerics nor ulema but former leftists, yet he offers no explanation for this fact. These politicos were able to move into the religious domain despite poor theological credentials, partly because, unlike Christianity, mainstream Islam has no institutional backbone. Catholicism is organized on the model of Rome, the empire state. But Sunni Islam has no organized hierarchy, only a prayer leader. Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini's creation of velayat-e faqih (The state of the jurist), with the clergy as constitutional guardians, is a relatively recent development that goes against the thrust of Shiite tradition. And judging by events in Iraq, such as Grand Ayatollah Ali Sistani's insistence that the ulema are a moral force outside, not within, the state, it does not seem to be taking well in non-Iranian Shiite milieus.

Roy's analysis has important implications. If secularism--the subordination of the church to the state--is mainly of institutional significance, then it would appear to be a given where Islam is not organized as an institutional power. But even where Islam is institutionalized, as in Iran or Saudi Arabia, Roy observes, "conservative Islam, without reformation, could be as compatible with democracy as Catholicism has been since it was defeated in its face-to-face confrontation with modern secularism at the end of the nineteenth century in France." In contrast to culturalist views, Roy's account can explain why a religious or cultural world-view (fundamentalism) does not necessarily have a political corollary (terrorism).

A WORLD-HISTORICAL MOMENT

Still, if Roy's sociological analysis is always insightful, it is, in the end, limited. His account of neofundamentalism, a religious tendency, cannot fully explain the nature of Islamism, a political construct; the first seeks salvation, the second liberation. Curiously, although Roy traces the transformation of Islamist parties in Muslim-majority Middle Eastern countries to political rather than sociological conditions, he attributes the rise of jihadist Islam in the Muslim diaspora in the West only to sociological causes. Ultimately, Roy's argument cannot explain why jihadist Islam, an ideology of marginal political significance in the late 1970s, has come to dominate Islamist politics any more than can Kepel's skillful intellectual history. And although both Roy and Kepel (the former perhaps more so than the latter) have begun to part from the premises of culture talk, the break is still incomplete.

They share a common failing: Kepel's history refuses to relate Islam to non-Islam, and Roy avoids studying encounters between Muslims and non-Muslims. Yet in fact, the birth of jihadist Islam, which embraces violence as central to political action, cannot be fully explained without reference to the Afghan jihad and the Western influences that shaped it. In the 1980s, the Reagan administration declared the Soviet Union an "evil empire" and set aside the then-common secular model of national liberation in favor of an international Islamic jihad. Thanks to that approach the Afghan rebels used charities to recruit tens of thousands of volunteers and created the militarized madrassas (Islamic schools) that turned these volunteers into cadres. Without the rallying cause of the jihad, the Afghan mujahideen would have had neither the numbers, the training, the organization, nor the coherence or sense of mission that has since turned jihadist Islam into a global political force.

The influence of the Afghan jihad cannot be overstated. It is evidence that the growth of political Islam has been less linear and more hybrid than is often acknowledged and that it has been driven largely by distinct political projects, such as the "global jihad" or "the West." And properly understanding the development of political Islam is the only way to gauge its prospects. According to Roy's account, political Islam will continue to bifurcate between an indigenous strand and an immigrant strand. According to Kepel's, the two strands will become more connected, but with the diaspora playing a more dynamic role, perhaps much like the African diaspora of a century ago, which later brought home notions of black consciousness and pan-Africanism developed in the West. But a full understanding of the political nature of the jihadist project, which neither Kepel's nor Roy's book quite achieves, begs a radically new question: Will political Islam follow the example of Marxism, which spread from the West to fuse with various local nationalisms and create hybrids potent enough to topple regimes?

It is too soon to tell, but anyone who wants to venture a guess should first turn to Iraq, where, more than anywhere else today, the future of political Islam is being cast. Every Middle Eastern movement that opposes the American empire--secular or religious, state or nonstate--is being drawn to Iraq, as if to a magnet, to test out its convictions. More than a year after the U.S. invasion, it has become clear that, by blowing the top off one of the region's most efficient dictatorships, the United States has created a free-for-all for fighters of every hue--Islamist and nationalist, from the homeland and the diaspora--sparking a contest that will influence the course of political Islam for years to come.

[Prometheus]

The Islamist View

The basis for the Islamist view - which is not supported by the majority of moderate Muslims - is that the individual undertaking a suicide bombing (the term they commonly use is "martyrdom operation") is doing what that individual understands is his/her Islamic duty, and thus regards their own life, in this world, as but a stage, a path, toward the next, and eternal, life. These radical schools of Islam teach that such a "martyrdom operation" may result in them be rewarded, by Allah, with Paradise (Jannah) and rewards such as 72 houri in the afterlife. That is, they are willing to sacrifice their own life in the hope of becoming a Shaheed, a martyr.

Furthermore, it has been argued by Islamist militant organisations (including Al Qaeda, Hamas and Islamic Jihad) that martyrdom operations are justified according to Islamic law, despite Islam strictly prohibiting suicide and murder.

ill highlight this off as it is what most seem to argue over......

this comes from

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Suicide_bomber

[Jessica]

Prom :

Citing sources close to the investigation, the BBC declared the used explosive was :

triacetone triperoxide (TATP)

An VERY UNSTABLE product made from products sold anywhere and in any shop.


So we go back to what i was saying about the bus blast :

I still think that stupid young guy was supposed to tube it and for whatever reason, he sat on a bus, gutted, going to his death.

[Jessica]

I have just given it some thought after i saw a photograph of a guy carrying a rucksack.

Theory :

Mister X wants to plant bombs in the city of London.

Mister X being known by the police cannot employ usual type bomb planters.

But Mister X knows the chippy boy ( chip shop) and other youngsters.
Mister X also knows a community guy who just had a baby and who desperately needs money.

Mister X has an idea :

What if he proposed money to these people to each carry a rucksack to london ?

So a, b, c and d accept.

After all, no questions asked, it's only a rucksack to carry, they only need to bring it, each to a given address, and they have been given clear indications, evne concerning th tube lines, so they don't get lost into london.

Oh, but mister C did get lost !!!

And for some UNKNOWN reason to him, all trains are blocked.

Nevermind, mister C decides to take the bus to go back to central london, so he can go back home with the rucksack.

He'll tell mister X he got lost and that he won't take the money.

But Mister C only has time to think it, before he explodes.

Who is guilty ?

3 teenagers and a man needing money, who could have unknowingly carried their death for money, or the commanditor ?


THEORY ONLY

One of the guys was jamaican, there are no clar linkings to al quaida, there were 3 gullible teens

Sounds to me as if they got all used.

I hope to be proved wrong.

If not, question :

WHO is mister X ?

and

WHERE is mister X ?

[Skeba]

Of course they got all used... There's a mastermind behind this, that didn't get killed.

But I do think, that all of these people knew what they were doing. Plus I think that the fact that according to the eye witness, with whose help the police were able to start identifying the men carrying bonbs, the man on the bus was constantly nervously looking at and going through his bag though he never took anything out, is a sign that he knew what was going to happen.

And if I remember right, I read in a newspaper that they have identified your mr. X, and that he left the country a day before the strikes. Yeah.. Here's the story on that (don't know how reliable they are, but some of the evening papers in finland used it as a source):
http://www.timesonline.co.uk/article/0,,22989-1694998,00.html

[Jessica]

cheers..

I do remember seeing young streatham and brixton kids ( south london) doing very veyr silly things for elder people, bringing stuff from one place to another.

i cannot go more into it, but i know that kids hav a tendancy to be impressed by big nasties.

In london, i actually saw white AND black kids whose heroes are still named reggie and ronny kray.

Says all.

[Prometheus]

I have just given it some thought after i saw a photograph of a guy carrying a rucksack.

Theory :

Mister X wants to plant bombs in the city of London.

Mister X being known by the police cannot employ usual type bomb planters.

But Mister X knows the chippy boy ( chip shop) and other youngsters.
Mister X also knows a community guy who just had a baby and who desperately needs money.

Mister X has an idea :

What if he proposed money to these people to each carry a rucksack to london ?

So a, b, c and d accept.

After all, no questions asked, it's only a rucksack to carry, they only need to bring it, each to a given address, and they have been given clear indications, evne concerning th tube lines, so they don't get lost into london.

Oh, but mister C did get lost !!!

And for some UNKNOWN reason to him, all trains are blocked.

Nevermind, mister C decides to take the bus to go back to central london, so he can go back home with the rucksack.

He'll tell mister X he got lost and that he won't take the money.

But Mister C only has time to think it, before he explodes.

Who is guilty ?

3 teenagers and a man needing money, who could have unknowingly carried their death for money, or the commanditor ?


THEORY ONLY

One of the guys was jamaican, there are no clar linkings to al quaida, there were 3 gullible teens

Sounds to me as if they got all used.

I hope to be proved wrong.

If not, question :

WHO is mister X ?

and

WHERE is mister X ?

only problem is this...... last guy the one lost..... why did it take about an extra hour for his bomb to go off....... and they were all timed? to add to your theory.... as like you said in the alst post you have seen kids doing strange stuff for old people... same happens here.......... maybe the timer was busted and set to go off in the tunnels... got top side to address and no one home tunnels shut down gets on bus.... unstable explosive mix goes by by on the bus......



we had a chem teacher that told us how to make tatp back in the day.... damned if i remember....... and if i did i would not say... all i need now is cisis knocking on my door (wouldnt be knocking it down cause they are too inept for that)

[Prometheus]

so that quote from the blasts across London thread..... General Rick Hillier CDS Canadian Forces (Cheif of Defence Staff) in short hes the head of the joint cheifs in canada.....

heres his press release

OTTAWA (CP) - Last week's terrorist attacks in London underscore the need for Canada and its allies to take the fight to the enemy in failed states where "murderous scumbags" have room to thrive, says Canada's top soldier.
ADVERTISEMENT

Terrorists must not be allowed to feed on the instability of countries like
Afghanistan lest that instability be allowed to "come home to roost here," Gen. Rick Hillier said Thursday. "The London attack actually tells us once more: we can't let up," Hillier told a media luncheon at National Defence Headquarters.

"There are those who might say that by doing that we make ourselves a target in Canada here for terrorists. I would come at it this way. . . . We need to take a stand."

More than 50 people died and 700 were wounded when four terrorists detonated bombs on London's subway system and a bus July 7. Hillier said Canadian military assets were offered but not needed.

Headquarters also verified the readiness of its counterterrorism force, confirmed its Norad capabilities and alerted the navy on both coasts after the bombings, he said.

Canada has maintained a
NATO force in Kabul since August 2003 and later this month will send 250 troops to establish a provincial reconstruction team under U.S. command in Kandahar, the new focus of Canadian operations.

The team will facilitate the work of aid groups, train police and help stabilize the area before a fighting force follows in the New Year.

Hillier said 1,500 Canadian troops will be in Afghanistan, mainly the south, by February. He said he expects at least two task forces and three reconstruction teams to rotate through Kandahar over the next 18 months.

Canada will also send a brigade headquarters for nine months, from February until October.

"We're not going to let those radical murderers and killers rob from others and certainly we're not going to let them rob from Canada," said Hillier, appointed chief of defence staff earlier this year.

Al-Qaida leader
Osama bin Laden declared Canada a "legitimate target" in March 2004. Two months later, an internal RCMP risk assessment noted that Canada was the only country left on his list that had yet to be attacked.

Hillier, who commanded NATO's International Security Assistance Force in Kabul for six months last year, said Canada has "a very big profile," regardless of what role its military plays in the Muslim world.

As a member of the G8, and as a highly rated Western society that values rights and individual freedoms, Canada already represents "the exact opposite of what people like Osama bin Laden, Mullah Omar and those others want."

"These are detestable murderers and scumbags," Hillier said. "They detest our freedoms, they detest our society, they detest our liberties."

He said they want power to dictate people's lives, money to maintain and expand their power, and immunity from responsibility for their actions.

"It doesn't matter whether we are in Afghanistan or any other place in the world. We are going to be a target in their sights . . . and I don't believe being in Afghanistan changes one aspect of it."